On April 24, 2013, the structure of the Rana Plaza building catastrophically collapsed, bringing down the entire 8-story reinforced concrete structure. The Plaza was originally designed as a four-story building primarily for retail store use, but was instead occupied by garment factories. With a death toll of 1,129 people, it is the deadliest accidental building collapse in history. (Dietz) Multiple factors led to the inadequacy of the design of the building's structure, including illegal construction, poor regulation of codes and inspections, and dangerous ignorance by the managerial staff. The Plaza was owned by Sohel Rana, who used his aggressive tenacity and political connections to acquire illegal permits and bribe government officials to approve construction. On the day prior to the collapse, warning signs of numerous cracks throughout structure and caution expressed by local engineers were ignored by the garment factory owner and managers, leading to unsafe occupation of the building and the tragic deaths of over a thousand workers. In the aftermath of the collapse, changes are being made in the Bangladesh building codes, inspection procedures, and safety standards of factories. Pressured by the Bangladeshi public's outrage and encouraged by foreign governments, world organizations, and retail companies, three major initiatives have been enacted to improve factory conditions and enforcement of regulations. The initiatives are all designed to encourage safer construction practices and working conditions, to empower industry inspectors, and to require increased involvement from the corporations who contract work to the factories. With these imperatives in place and through continued emphasis from the public and the world, the systems in place in Bangladesh can be improved and made both safer and more efficient.
Building Description
Figure 1: Cross Section of the Rana Plaza Structure (Photo courtesy of Jeana Ripple and Barbara Porada. Pending Approval.)
Rana Plaza was an eight-story reinforced concrete structure, with a ninth story under construction at the time of the collapse. The building was rectangular in shape with a glass facade entrance at the front end. Two stair towers near the rear of the building were the main escape routes in times of emergency. This layout was not adequate for safe evacuation during times of emergency, a clear code violation, which was one of many. The first and second floors of the Plaza were rented by offices, shops, and a bank, and the third through eighth floors of the building were rented by garment manufacturers. The structure of the building was cast-in-place concrete with steel reinforcement. The design was simple in nature with flat slabs supported by typical beams and columns. The interior of the building was dimly lit and does not have dedicated air conditioning technologies. Fans were occasionally used to induce air flow and to disperse the heat that gathered in the building. Working conditions were not pleasant, a staple of the garment industry. Four diesel generators located on the roof of the building were installed as a means of emergency power during frequent power outages that the city experiences. They were known to activate over a dozen times per day in order to restore electricity and clothing production. (Motlagh 2014) Rana Plaza was opened in August 2009 and by 2011, the third through eighth floors were fully occupied by garment factories. Each floor was rented by a different company, each with their own materials, supplies, equipment, and personnel. Combined across all renters, the building brought in about 1.5 million euros annually, about 1.85 million US dollars. (Motlagh 2014)
Summary of Events
On April 23, 2013, visible cracks could be seen throughout the structure of the Rana Plaza, primarily on the seventh floor. Some of these cracks were as much as two inches deep and deeply alarmed the workers inside the building. Because of these cracks the Plaza was immediately evacuated and a local engineer brought in to assess the situation. After his review, the engineer recommended that it remain closed until it could be inspected by professional engineers and technicians. Around this time, a local news station arrived to report the story, spreading awareness of the situation for hundreds of miles. Ignoring the engineer, Sohel Rana had his own inspectors and engineers examine the building. Through bribes and other influence, he was able to convince them to open Rana Plaza for operation. (Whearty et al. 2014) Sohel ignored the warnings from other engineers and the dangers of the building, and thought only of continuing production at any cost. He was fueled by both insatiable greed and the pressure from major corporate clients to deliver merchandise orders on schedule. Delays could be catastrophic to client relations because corporate clients demanded quick turn around on contracts. The next day, April 24, a large crowd of several hundred had gathered outside of Rana Plaza, many of whom were irate and confused workers. They had assumed that the building would remain close based upon the warning from the engineer, but they had received notice to show for work. Regardless, many of the crowd were extremely hesitant to enter the dangerously unstable complex and return to work. Sohel, recognizing their hesitation, went to factory managers and supervisors and told them to force people inside. They threatened to retain overtime pay or to fire workers if they did not enter the building. (Motlagh 2014)
Faced with no other option the workers entered Rana Plaza and returned to work at approximately 8:45am. At 9:00am, the power cut-out, a very common occurrence in Bangladesh. The generators on the roof activated, restoring power and sending vibrations through the building, as typical. This vibration was noticeably stronger than typical and caused the building to shake violently. Panicked, workers began to run for exits, but before they could could escape the structure, there was a loud clap and the building began to progressively fail from the top down, each floor collapsing on top of the other in a pancake fashion. In under a minute the entire building had collapsed, as seen in Figure 2 below. It is believed that the collapse propagated on the 7th floor at a southwest corner column, most likely a column underneath one or more of the electrical generators. As this floor collapsed, it overloaded the floor below leading to further collapse, trapping several thousand people inside a network of concrete and steel. (Motlagh 2014)
Figure 2: Rana Plaza shortly after collapse.(Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.)
Investigation & Cause of Failure
Shortly after the collapse, the Bangladeshi government organized and directed a high-level committee to investigate the disaster site and determine the causes of the failure. Through their investigation, they discovered several contributing causes, many developing from the beginning moments of its construction. These causes were:
Unsuitable land for multi-story construction.
Use of poor quality construction materials.
Loads placed on the building that were not within design criteria.
Poor regulation and enforcement of building codes.
High demand within the garment market.
The land underneath the Rana Plaza was unsuitable for construction. In their report, the committee stated that "the ground the Rana Plaza was built on was unfit for a multi-story building". (Whearty et al. 2014) Before construction, a marshy swamp land with a small pond could be seen at the site of the Plaza. The soil composition of the land was unstable and had inadequate strength to support the weight of the building. (Dietz) However, instead of removing the unstable soil and replacing it with better, stronger soil with the strength needed to support the building, rubbish and trash was used to fill in the swamp. Sohel was able to bribe officials to grant him the permits necessary for construction, despite the poor soil strength. Also, he bribed several engineers and the local mayor to sign off on the project and allow construction to proceed. These poor ground conditions were not able to support the loads of the building and it is believed they lead to differential settlement, weakening the structure. (Whearty et al. 2014)
The committee found that construction "used extremely poor quality iron rods and cement". It was common for cheaper materials to be used in construction in Bangladesh. Some of this came from an effort to cut costs on the project, and some of it came from inexperience of the builders. For the Plaza, cement used to make the concrete included too much sand, making it more brittle and weak. In addition, the sub-floors were cast too thin and did not have the necessary depth and strength needed to disperse and support the loads of the building. The reinforcing steel used in the concrete also had its share of issues. Due to unavailability and high cost, it was a difficult material to obtain. In order to decrease the budget, less steel was embedded in the concrete than was called for in the design. This drastically decreased the overall strength of the concrete and made it much more susceptible to tension loads. The committee postulated that had the proper amount of steel been used within the concrete, the collapse may have been localized rather than progressive. Furthermore, smooth bars were used as reinforcing, rather than the typical textured bars used today. (Dietz) Smooth bars do not form as strong of a bond with concrete because the smooth surface does not facilitate a strong connection with the aggregate. Textured bars provide an undulating surface that gives the aggregate something to "grip" onto, providing more tensile support within the concrete. With both an inadequate amount of steel and a use of smooth bars over textured bars, the structure was weaker than designed and was susceptible to tension loads. (Whearty et. al 2014)
Loads were added to the building that were not in the original design. The Plaza was planned to be a four-story building that would house primarily retail and office space. However, four additional floors were illegally added to the structure, with a ninth under construction.at the time of collapse. Through bribes and extortion, Sohel Rana had these extra floors built without getting the proper permits or approval from the local government. (Motlagh 2014) The illegal construction more than doubled the height of the building and put tremendous stress on the structure. Furthermore, the building was designed to handle the loads of office and retail space, but was instead used mostly in an industrial capacity. The first and second floors were occupied by banks and retail space, but the third through eighth floors were occupied by garment factories. These factories meant much larger loads created by heavy sewing equipment, hundreds of employees, and large stockpiles of garments and fabrics. (Whearty et al. 2014) The design loads for office, retail, and manufacturing occupancy types from the Bangladesh National Building Code are broken down in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Uniform Design Loads in Bangladesh Design and Construction(Courtesy of the Bangladesh National Building Code)
As can be seen in Table 1, the uniform loads for office and retail occupancy types are very similar in scale. On the other hand, the uniform loads for manufacturing occupancy type were considerably larger and could be up to twice as large. Depending on the actual weight created by the factories, which is presumably in the range of 125 to 250 psf, the load placed on the building could be nearly twice what it was actually designed for. Even with the factors of safety built into calculations and into these uniform loads, this is an added weight that could not be safely withstood by the structure. In addition, four large diesel generators were installed on the roof of the Plaza in order to backup the electricity of the building, which went out frequently. The roof was certainly not built to withstand the weight of these generators, each weighing several metric tons. (Motlagh 2014) Furthermore, when activated, the generators caused noticeable shaking of the structure, jeopardizing it further. It was this vibration that ultimately unsettled the building and set off the progressive collapse. (Whearty et al. 2014) The location where these generators were placed on the roof is not exactly documented. However, it can be theorized that one or more was located over the failing south-west column, since the generators were the cause of the collapse that began in that location.
Regulations and building codes in Bangladesh were rarely fully enforced. Corruption and politics play a major role throughout the construction industry in Bangladesh. Building owners are able to exert their influence in order to get around the law or to convince officials to allow what they want. There are numerous instances where construction of the Rana Plaza should have been stopped or corrected, but it wasn't. Sohel Rana was able to take advantage of the deficiencies in the system through his connections to political allies and his wealth. Not only did he make sure that inspections were rarely performed, but Sohel was able to bribe officials to build on a rejected plot of land, to add additional floors to the building, and to convince workers to enter the building despite the cracks and warnings from engineers. (Motlagh 2014) He used his political connections to obtain permits and permissions to build. Unfortunately, the Plaza isn't the only building where these immoral and illegal practices were followed. According to the Bangladesh building code, all new construction must apply for and receive an occupancy certificate from a government organization. However, only six have been properly issued since 2008, despite estimates of over 4,000 buildings built each year. (Whearty et al. 2014) This statistic clearly shows that there is a significant level of corruption throughout the Bangladesh construction industry, allowing building owners to easily abuse the system.
There is a very high worldwide demand for cheap garments. Consumers throughout the world enjoy purchasing mass quantities of clothing and other merchandise at the lowest possible cost. They demand the ability to buy cheap shirts, jeans, dresses, and other clothing, with little thought of how the products are made. Corporations respond to this demand by placing pressure on their international factories to produce clothes quickly and at low cost. They respond poorly to delays or issues in the process, often laying down harsh penalties in response. This corporate pressure then leads factory owners and managers to work their laborers tirelessly, requiring long hours of labor for little pay. It is this high level of demand that lead to the poor working conditions that plague garment factories throughout the world, particularly in Bangladesh. The pressures that Sohel faced from this industry lead him to make many poor decisions, that sadly lead to the deaths of over a thousand workers. (Motlagh 2014)
Rescue Efforts
Figure 3: Locals and other rescue workers scan the debris for survivors. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.)
Immediately following the collapse, police and fire brigade were dispatched to Rana Plaza, but they did not arrive for 10 to 15 minutes. The first responders to the scene were several hundred local residents who had heard the collapse or heard of the collapse and came to assist those trapped inside the rubble. Many people voluntarily entered the debris field, risking their own lives, in order to save as many of the victims as possible, as can be seen in Figure 3 and 4 to the right. They also brought supplies such as water, medicine, and bandages to help anyone in need. If they were running low on any valuable materials, they utilized social media to communicate with each other and ask for additional supplies. As emergency personnel arrived and rescue efforts intensified, some survivors had to be physically cut from the rubble they were trapped under. In many unfortunate instances, they had to be amputated in the field in order to be safely freed. From the Plaza, all wounded were transported to Enam Medical College & Hospital, located less than a mile away. The hospital was only set up to treat 750 patients and was quickly over capacity. Make shift beds were set up to hold more patients and first year medical students were called in to assist the staff of the hospital. Nearby medical facilities sent supplies to restock the hospital's reserves as they were depleted to treat all of the wounded.
Figure 4: Rescuers prepare to scan the wreckage for survivors. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)
Rescuers worked quickly against the clock. Trapped victims faced death from dehydration. exposure to high temperatures, oxygen depletion, and their injuries. On May 13, after 20 days, rescue efforts were concluded with over 2,500 survivors pulled from the debris. The government had been ill prepared to deal with the scope of the disaster and it was primarily the heroic efforts of the local residents who saved the lives of so many people.
Aftermath
In the aftermath of the collapse, change has been ushered into Bangladesh's government and it's building industry. International organizations, foreign allies, local institutions, and large retailers have been strong promoters of improving the working situations for garment factory workers. In addition, the Bangladesh public has been in outrage since the disaster and has prominently voiced their desire for change to the industry and their working conditions. The catalyst of this movement comes from the collapse of Rana Plaza. In the weeks following the tragedy, public protests of the garment industry were commonplace. On May 1, one of the largest protests occurred with several thousand workers marching through Dhaka to protest poor working conditions. In June 2013, a large protest near the site of the Plaza was broken up by police using tear gas and batons. The unrest continued as workers demanded an increase in minimum wage from $37 per month to $104 per month. Facing pressure from upset workers and the government, in November 2013, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exports Association (BGMEA) raised the minimum wage to $68 per month, a huge victory for the workers.
Another victory for the people of Bangladesh was the first successful trial against a member of the garment factory industry in December 2013. Delwar Hossain, his wife, and 11 factory managers were charged with culpable homicide after Tazreen Fashions burned down killing 117 people. Flammable chemicals were improperly stored in the factory and the exit paths were not clear for escape. The high-level state investigation accused them of "unpardonable negligence". A number of people were also arrested during the months following the Rana Plaza collapse, including engineers, managers, and politicians. One of the chief engineers of the project, the mayor of Savar, and most of the managers of the building face charges for the deaths of the workers. Sohel is still in prison awaiting police prosecution.
Since the collapse, three major initiatives have been enacted to improve conditions in Bangladesh: the Accord on Fire and Building Safety, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, and a joint strategy between the United Nations and Bangladesh. All three initiatives are designed to encourage safe construction and work practices, empower the industry to have more regular inspections by hiring additional inspectors, and increase corporation involvement by requiring them to pay for upgrades to their factory buildings in order to reach appropriate safety standards. The Accord is a legally binding document lasting five years for the companies who sign it and primarily involves countries from the European Union. It requires corporations to hire a third party to conduct inspections of their factories and protects workers by giving them the freedom to voice their concerns without the fear of being fired and guarantees workers salary even if they cannot work due to factory renovations or stoppages. The Alliance involves mainly US companies and retailers, and aims to bring them together to inspect 100% of their factories within 5 years and set them to safety standards. The biggest difference between the Alliance and the Accord is the Alliance relieves corporations of most of the liability they would face if accidents were to occur.
Conclusion
There were many different factors that led up to the collapse of the Rana Plaza on April 24, 2013, making it difficult to pinpoint one issue as the deciding fault. The building itself had structural integrity issues due to to the weak soil foundation beneath, the use of poor quality materials during construction, increased loads due to additional floors and a change in occupancy type from the design, and four rooftop generators that shook the building during operation. These physical issues combined with a inspection and regulation system that failed to check the building, notice the apparent issues, and cease construction or operation due to the unsafe nature of the building, created a very dangerous situation that sadly resulted in the collapse of the Plaza and the deaths and injuries to thousands of workers. Sohel Rana, like many building owners in Bangladesh, used his power, money, and political connections to cheat the system, acquire illegal permits, and ignore professional opinion, leading to immoral decisions that put thousands in harms way.
If there is a silver lining to this horrific event, it is that the terrible nature of the tragedy has shocked the world and the Bangladesh government and people into action. Through the inaction of the Accord, the Alliance, and the UN/Bangladesh agreement, change will be seen in the garment industry in Bangladesh and throughout the world. Over the next several years, working conditions will be made safer as unsafe garment factories are shut down and the corporations who use them pay to have them renovated into safe operation.
Photo Credits
Figure 1: This photo is copyrighted by Jeana Ripple and Barbara Porada and can be seen in The Ghosts of Rana Plaza by Jason Motlagh of the Virginia Quarterly Review. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here.
Cover & Figure 2: This photo is copyrighted by Rijans007, who uploaded it through Flickr to Wikimedia Commons. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here. The license covering this photo can be found here.
Figure 3: This photo is copyrighted by Sharat Chowdhury, who uploaded it to Wikimedia Commons. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here. The license covering this photo can be found here.
Figure 4: This photo is copyrighted by Sharat Chowdhury, who uploaded it to Wikimedia Commons. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here. The license covering this photo can be found here.
Bibliography
“After Rana Plaza.” Bangladesh All Party Parliamentary Group. Parliamentary Liaison Office. 2013. Page 18-28, 35-40, 53-60. An extensive research paper that examines the current situation of Bangalesh working conditions, policies, regulations, and government structure and suggests methods of improving them to avoid future disasters.
Bangladesh National Building Code: 2012.Housing and Building Research Institute. 2012.
A comprehensive list of regulations and laws that govern construction and design practices in Bangladesh.
Link: http://buildingcode.gov.bd/
Gold, David. “Out of the Ashes.” The Safety and Health Practitioner. CMP Information Ltd. May 2014. An article about the changes that are coming about due to the Rana Plaza collapse.
Motlagh, Jason. “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza.” Virginia Quarterly Review. Spring 2014. A detailed report of the collapse, the causes, and the aftermath that ensued, with particular attention to the survivors of the disaster. Link: http://www.vqronline.org/reporting-articles/2014/04/ghosts-rana-plaza
Quelch, John A. and Rodriguez, Margaret L. “Rana Plaza: Bangladesh Garment Tragedy (A).” Harvard Business School. Oct. 31, 2013. A document that analyzes the political and social conditions prior to and following the Rana Plaza collapse, and the implications the collapse could have on production and codes.
Sabet, Daniel M. and Tazreen, Afsana. “Building Construction Laws and their Enforcement: Looking Beyond Rana Plaza.” ULAB: Center for Enterprise and Society. July 2013. A document that examines how regulatory issues negatively affected construction. Link: http://www.ulab.edu.bd/CES/documents/Building_Code_Analysis-hi.pdf
Whearty, Torpie, Catania, and Terris. "Rana Plaza Engineering Disaster." ESG 201 Learning from Disasters. Stony Brook University. 2014.
A technical report that describes the history of the garment factory in Bangladesh, the events leading up to the collapse, and the events following the disaster - including an analysis of how builders did not follow local rules and legislation leading to the collapse.
Link: https://stonybrook.digication.com/joseph_whearty_esg_201_learning_from_disasters/Rana_Plaza_Final_Report
Savar, Bangladesh - April 24, 2013
Garrett Schwier, Architectural Engineering, BAE/MAE
Table of Contents
Introduction
On April 24, 2013, the structure of the Rana Plaza building catastrophically collapsed, bringing down the entire 8-story reinforced concrete structure. The Plaza was originally designed as a four-story building primarily for retail store use, but was instead occupied by garment factories. With a death toll of 1,129 people, it is the deadliest accidental building collapse in history. (Dietz) Multiple factors led to the inadequacy of the design of the building's structure, including illegal construction, poor regulation of codes and inspections, and dangerous ignorance by the managerial staff. The Plaza was owned by Sohel Rana, who used his aggressive tenacity and political connections to acquire illegal permits and bribe government officials to approve construction. On the day prior to the collapse, warning signs of numerous cracks throughout structure and caution expressed by local engineers were ignored by the garment factory owner and managers, leading to unsafe occupation of the building and the tragic deaths of over a thousand workers. In the aftermath of the collapse, changes are being made in the Bangladesh building codes, inspection procedures, and safety standards of factories. Pressured by the Bangladeshi public's outrage and encouraged by foreign governments, world organizations, and retail companies, three major initiatives have been enacted to improve factory conditions and enforcement of regulations. The initiatives are all designed to encourage safer construction practices and working conditions, to empower industry inspectors, and to require increased involvement from the corporations who contract work to the factories. With these imperatives in place and through continued emphasis from the public and the world, the systems in place in Bangladesh can be improved and made both safer and more efficient.Building Description
(Photo courtesy of Jeana Ripple and Barbara Porada. Pending Approval.)
Rana Plaza was opened in August 2009 and by 2011, the third through eighth floors were fully occupied by garment factories. Each floor was rented by a different company, each with their own materials, supplies, equipment, and personnel. Combined across all renters, the building brought in about 1.5 million euros annually, about 1.85 million US dollars. (Motlagh 2014)
Summary of Events
On April 23, 2013, visible cracks could be seen throughout the structure of the Rana Plaza, primarily on the seventh floor. Some of these cracks were as much as two inches deep and deeply alarmed the workers inside the building. Because of these cracks the Plaza was immediately evacuated and a local engineer brought in to assess the situation. After his review, the engineer recommended that it remain closed until it could be inspected by professional engineers and technicians. Around this time, a local news station arrived to report the story, spreading awareness of the situation for hundreds of miles. Ignoring the engineer, Sohel Rana had his own inspectors and engineers examine the building. Through bribes and other influence, he was able to convince them to open Rana Plaza for operation. (Whearty et al. 2014) Sohel ignored the warnings from other engineers and the dangers of the building, and thought only of continuing production at any cost. He was fueled by both insatiable greed and the pressure from major corporate clients to deliver merchandise orders on schedule. Delays could be catastrophic to client relations because corporate clients demanded quick turn around on contracts. The next day, April 24, a large crowd of several hundred had gathered outside of Rana Plaza, many of whom were irate and confused workers. They had assumed that the building would remain close based upon the warning from the engineer, but they had received notice to show for work. Regardless, many of the crowd were extremely hesitant to enter the dangerously unstable complex and return to work. Sohel, recognizing their hesitation, went to factory managers and supervisors and told them to force people inside. They threatened to retain overtime pay or to fire workers if they did not enter the building. (Motlagh 2014)Faced with no other option the workers entered Rana Plaza and returned to work at approximately 8:45am. At 9:00am, the power cut-out, a very common occurrence in Bangladesh. The generators on the roof activated, restoring power and sending vibrations through the building, as typical. This vibration was noticeably stronger than typical and caused the building to shake violently. Panicked, workers began to run for exits, but before they could could escape the structure, there was a loud clap and the building began to progressively fail from the top down, each floor collapsing on top of the other in a pancake fashion. In under a minute the entire building had collapsed, as seen in Figure 2 below. It is believed that the collapse propagated on the 7th floor at a southwest corner column, most likely a column underneath one or more of the electrical generators. As this floor collapsed, it overloaded the floor below leading to further collapse, trapping several thousand people inside a network of concrete and steel. (Motlagh 2014)
Investigation & Cause of Failure
Shortly after the collapse, the Bangladeshi government organized and directed a high-level committee to investigate the disaster site and determine the causes of the failure. Through their investigation, they discovered several contributing causes, many developing from the beginning moments of its construction. These causes were:The land underneath the Rana Plaza was unsuitable for construction. In their report, the committee stated that "the ground the Rana Plaza was built on was unfit for a multi-story building". (Whearty et al. 2014) Before construction, a marshy swamp land with a small pond could be seen at the site of the Plaza. The soil composition of the land was unstable and had inadequate strength to support the weight of the building. (Dietz) However, instead of removing the unstable soil and replacing it with better, stronger soil with the strength needed to support the building, rubbish and trash was used to fill in the swamp. Sohel was able to bribe officials to grant him the permits necessary for construction, despite the poor soil strength. Also, he bribed several engineers and the local mayor to sign off on the project and allow construction to proceed. These poor ground conditions were not able to support the loads of the building and it is believed they lead to differential settlement, weakening the structure. (Whearty et al. 2014)
The committee found that construction "used extremely poor quality iron rods and cement". It was common for cheaper materials to be used in construction in Bangladesh. Some of this came from an effort to cut costs on the project, and some of it came from inexperience of the builders. For the Plaza, cement used to make the concrete included too much sand, making it more brittle and weak. In addition, the sub-floors were cast too thin and did not have the necessary depth and strength needed to disperse and support the loads of the building. The reinforcing steel used in the concrete also had its share of issues. Due to unavailability and high cost, it was a difficult material to obtain. In order to decrease the budget, less steel was embedded in the concrete than was called for in the design. This drastically decreased the overall strength of the concrete and made it much more susceptible to tension loads. The committee postulated that had the proper amount of steel been used within the concrete, the collapse may have been localized rather than progressive. Furthermore, smooth bars were used as reinforcing, rather than the typical textured bars used today. (Dietz) Smooth bars do not form as strong of a bond with concrete because the smooth surface does not facilitate a strong connection with the aggregate. Textured bars provide an undulating surface that gives the aggregate something to "grip" onto, providing more tensile support within the concrete. With both an inadequate amount of steel and a use of smooth bars over textured bars, the structure was weaker than designed and was susceptible to tension loads. (Whearty et. al 2014)
Loads were added to the building that were not in the original design. The Plaza was planned to be a four-story building that would house primarily retail and office space. However, four additional floors were illegally added to the structure, with a ninth under construction.at the time of collapse. Through bribes and extortion, Sohel Rana had these extra floors built without getting the proper permits or approval from the local government. (Motlagh 2014) The illegal construction more than doubled the height of the building and put tremendous stress on the structure. Furthermore, the building was designed to handle the loads of office and retail space, but was instead used mostly in an industrial capacity. The first and second floors were occupied by banks and retail space, but the third through eighth floors were occupied by garment factories. These factories meant much larger loads created by heavy sewing equipment, hundreds of employees, and large stockpiles of garments and fabrics. (Whearty et al. 2014) The design loads for office, retail, and manufacturing occupancy types from the Bangladesh National Building Code are broken down in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Uniform Design Loads in Bangladesh Design and Construction(Courtesy of the Bangladesh National Building Code)
As can be seen in Table 1, the uniform loads for office and retail occupancy types are very similar in scale. On the other hand, the uniform loads for manufacturing occupancy type were considerably larger and could be up to twice as large. Depending on the actual weight created by the factories, which is presumably in the range of 125 to 250 psf, the load placed on the building could be nearly twice what it was actually designed for. Even with the factors of safety built into calculations and into these uniform loads, this is an added weight that could not be safely withstood by the structure. In addition, four large diesel generators were installed on the roof of the Plaza in order to backup the electricity of the building, which went out frequently. The roof was certainly not built to withstand the weight of these generators, each weighing several metric tons. (Motlagh 2014) Furthermore, when activated, the generators caused noticeable shaking of the structure, jeopardizing it further. It was this vibration that ultimately unsettled the building and set off the progressive collapse. (Whearty et al. 2014) The location where these generators were placed on the roof is not exactly documented. However, it can be theorized that one or more was located over the failing south-west column, since the generators were the cause of the collapse that began in that location.
Regulations and building codes in Bangladesh were rarely fully enforced. Corruption and politics play a major role throughout the construction industry in Bangladesh. Building owners are able to exert their influence in order to get around the law or to convince officials to allow what they want. There are numerous instances where construction of the Rana Plaza should have been stopped or corrected, but it wasn't. Sohel Rana was able to take advantage of the deficiencies in the system through his connections to political allies and his wealth. Not only did he make sure that inspections were rarely performed, but Sohel was able to bribe officials to build on a rejected plot of land, to add additional floors to the building, and to convince workers to enter the building despite the cracks and warnings from engineers. (Motlagh 2014) He used his political connections to obtain permits and permissions to build. Unfortunately, the Plaza isn't the only building where these immoral and illegal practices were followed. According to the Bangladesh building code, all new construction must apply for and receive an occupancy certificate from a government organization. However, only six have been properly issued since 2008, despite estimates of over 4,000 buildings built each year. (Whearty et al. 2014) This statistic clearly shows that there is a significant level of corruption throughout the Bangladesh construction industry, allowing building owners to easily abuse the system.
There is a very high worldwide demand for cheap garments. Consumers throughout the world enjoy purchasing mass quantities of clothing and other merchandise at the lowest possible cost. They demand the ability to buy cheap shirts, jeans, dresses, and other clothing, with little thought of how the products are made. Corporations respond to this demand by placing pressure on their international factories to produce clothes quickly and at low cost. They respond poorly to delays or issues in the process, often laying down harsh penalties in response. This corporate pressure then leads factory owners and managers to work their laborers tirelessly, requiring long hours of labor for little pay. It is this high level of demand that lead to the poor working conditions that plague garment factories throughout the world, particularly in Bangladesh. The pressures that Sohel faced from this industry lead him to make many poor decisions, that sadly lead to the deaths of over a thousand workers. (Motlagh 2014)
Rescue Efforts
Rescuers worked quickly against the clock. Trapped victims faced death from dehydration. exposure to high temperatures, oxygen depletion, and their injuries. On May 13, after 20 days, rescue efforts were concluded with over 2,500 survivors pulled from the debris. The government had been ill prepared to deal with the scope of the disaster and it was primarily the heroic efforts of the local residents who saved the lives of so many people.
Aftermath
In the aftermath of the collapse, change has been ushered into Bangladesh's government and it's building industry. International organizations, foreign allies, local institutions, and large retailers have been strong promoters of improving the working situations for garment factory workers. In addition, the Bangladesh public has been in outrage since the disaster and has prominently voiced their desire for change to the industry and their working conditions. The catalyst of this movement comes from the collapse of Rana Plaza. In the weeks following the tragedy, public protests of the garment industry were commonplace. On May 1, one of the largest protests occurred with several thousand workers marching through Dhaka to protest poor working conditions. In June 2013, a large protest near the site of the Plaza was broken up by police using tear gas and batons. The unrest continued as workers demanded an increase in minimum wage from $37 per month to $104 per month. Facing pressure from upset workers and the government, in November 2013, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exports Association (BGMEA) raised the minimum wage to $68 per month, a huge victory for the workers.Another victory for the people of Bangladesh was the first successful trial against a member of the garment factory industry in December 2013. Delwar Hossain, his wife, and 11 factory managers were charged with culpable homicide after Tazreen Fashions burned down killing 117 people. Flammable chemicals were improperly stored in the factory and the exit paths were not clear for escape. The high-level state investigation accused them of "unpardonable negligence". A number of people were also arrested during the months following the Rana Plaza collapse, including engineers, managers, and politicians. One of the chief engineers of the project, the mayor of Savar, and most of the managers of the building face charges for the deaths of the workers. Sohel is still in prison awaiting police prosecution.
Since the collapse, three major initiatives have been enacted to improve conditions in Bangladesh: the Accord on Fire and Building Safety, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, and a joint strategy between the United Nations and Bangladesh. All three initiatives are designed to encourage safe construction and work practices, empower the industry to have more regular inspections by hiring additional inspectors, and increase corporation involvement by requiring them to pay for upgrades to their factory buildings in order to reach appropriate safety standards. The Accord is a legally binding document lasting five years for the companies who sign it and primarily involves countries from the European Union. It requires corporations to hire a third party to conduct inspections of their factories and protects workers by giving them the freedom to voice their concerns without the fear of being fired and guarantees workers salary even if they cannot work due to factory renovations or stoppages. The Alliance involves mainly US companies and retailers, and aims to bring them together to inspect 100% of their factories within 5 years and set them to safety standards. The biggest difference between the Alliance and the Accord is the Alliance relieves corporations of most of the liability they would face if accidents were to occur.
Conclusion
There were many different factors that led up to the collapse of the Rana Plaza on April 24, 2013, making it difficult to pinpoint one issue as the deciding fault. The building itself had structural integrity issues due to to the weak soil foundation beneath, the use of poor quality materials during construction, increased loads due to additional floors and a change in occupancy type from the design, and four rooftop generators that shook the building during operation. These physical issues combined with a inspection and regulation system that failed to check the building, notice the apparent issues, and cease construction or operation due to the unsafe nature of the building, created a very dangerous situation that sadly resulted in the collapse of the Plaza and the deaths and injuries to thousands of workers. Sohel Rana, like many building owners in Bangladesh, used his power, money, and political connections to cheat the system, acquire illegal permits, and ignore professional opinion, leading to immoral decisions that put thousands in harms way.If there is a silver lining to this horrific event, it is that the terrible nature of the tragedy has shocked the world and the Bangladesh government and people into action. Through the inaction of the Accord, the Alliance, and the UN/Bangladesh agreement, change will be seen in the garment industry in Bangladesh and throughout the world. Over the next several years, working conditions will be made safer as unsafe garment factories are shut down and the corporations who use them pay to have them renovated into safe operation.
Photo Credits
Figure 1: This photo is copyrighted by Jeana Ripple and Barbara Porada and can be seen in The Ghosts of Rana Plaza by Jason Motlagh of the Virginia Quarterly Review. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here.Cover & Figure 2: This photo is copyrighted by Rijans007, who uploaded it through Flickr to Wikimedia Commons. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here. The license covering this photo can be found here.
Figure 3: This photo is copyrighted by Sharat Chowdhury, who uploaded it to Wikimedia Commons. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here. The license covering this photo can be found here.
Figure 4: This photo is copyrighted by Sharat Chowdhury, who uploaded it to Wikimedia Commons. Use of this photo is purely for this report and is not meant to suggest that the artist endorses any opinions expressed here. The license covering this photo can be found here.
Bibliography
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A document that examines how regulatory issues negatively affected construction.
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An article explaining the immediate response and measures taken following the collapse.
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Link: https://stonybrook.digication.com/joseph_whearty_esg_201_learning_from_disasters/Rana_Plaza_Final_Report